Why did lbj escalate the war

The major initiative in the Lyndon Johnson presidency was the Vietnam War. By , the United States had , troops in Vietnam and had already lost 30, Americans there. Johnson's approval ratings had dropped from 70 percent in mid to below 40 percent by , and with it, his mastery of Congress. So what the hell do I do? Johnson never did figure out the answer to that question. The North was led by a Communist and nationalist regime that had fought against the Japanese in World War II and against French colonial rule in the late s.

In , it won control of North Vietnam when the French agreed to a partition in the Geneva Accords. A Catholic, Diem was unable to consolidate his rule with a predominantly Buddhist population. He governed with the support of a military supplied and trained by the United States and with substantial U. By the late s, a Communist guerrilla force in the South, the Viet Cong, was fighting to overthrow the Diem regime.

By the early s, it was receiving substantial military and logistical assistance from the Communists in the North. Thus the Vietnam conflict could be seen through three lenses: 1 it was a civil war between pro- and anti-Diem groups in the South; 2 it was a war of reunification waged by the North against the South; and 3 it was viewed by the United States as part of the conspiracy by the Sino-Soviet bloc to conquer the Third World and install Communist regimes.

Throughout the conflict, American Presidents were unwilling to see South Vietnam conquered by Communist forces, and thus each of them made the same commitment to forestall a Communist victory. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower had commenced American involvement there by sending military advisers. Kennedy had begun assigning Special Forces military personnel to Vietnam, ostensibly in an advisory capacity as well, and there were about 20, there when he was assassinated in For Johnson, the decision to continue the Vietnam commitment followed the path of his predecessors.

He was committed to maintaining an independent South Vietnam and to achieving success in Southeast Asia. As a senator, he had embraced "containment theory," which predicted that if Vietnam fell to Communists, other Southeast Asian nations would do the same. Johnson was deeply sensitive about the judgment of history, and he did not want to be remembered as a President who lost Southeast Asia to Communism. When Johnson took office, he affirmed the Kennedy administration's commitments.

In August , after reports that U. By a vote of 98 to 2 in the Senate and a unanimous vote in the House, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the President to take all measures necessary to protect the armed forces.

Johnson would later use this as a "functional equivalent" to a declaration of war, though his critics would respond that he should have gone to Congress for a formal declaration. During the summer and fall of , Johnson campaigned on a peace platform and had no intention of escalating the war if it were not absolutely necessary.

On March 8, , two Marine battalions, 3, troops, went ashore near Da Nang to protect the airfields, with orders to shoot only if shot at—this was the first time U. On April 3, Johnson authorized two additional Marine battalions, one Marine air squadron, and an increase in logistical support units of 20, men. He also authorized troops to go on active "search and destroy" missions.

By mid-April, Marines had moved to full-scale offensive operations. By November , there were , troops and by , an additional , The number would surge to , by the end of Johnson's presidency. Johnson's decisions were based on complicated political and military considerations. LBJ steered a middle course: The "hawks" in Congress and in the military wanted him to engage in massive bombing of enemy cities, threaten to use nuclear weapons, and even threaten to invade North Vietnam.

This might have led to Chinese entry into the war, as had happened in the Korean War, or even Soviet engagement. The President's "middle way" involved a commitment of U. One of Johnson's major problems was that Hanoi was willing to accept the costs of continuing the war indefinitely and of absorbing the punishing bombing.

It would do so until the United States decided to give up its commitment to aid the South. McNamara and his "war game" analysts in the Department of Defense failed to account adequately for this eventuality.

Fissures began to split American society. The president evidently recognised by late that his policies were failing. They are going to throw our asses out. Still, the most imperative mistake of the Kennedy administration occurred during the Buddhist crisis.

Furthermore, governmental troops fired into the crowds, consequently triggering widespread popular resentment. Indeed, the immolation of Thich Duc on 11th June electrified the population and crystalized a peaceful religious movement into a political rebellion. The effect was reinforced by provocative statements from both Nhu and his wife who additionally pressured Diem towards religious warfare. More importantly, the Buddhist crisis provided the Kennedy administration with an exit strategy.

Sorensen exemplifies the outrage of U. Instead, the U. Therefore, U. Even so, the President most associated with military escalation in Vietnam is Johnson. Hunt especially portrays him as a warmongering hawk who devilishly invigorated war. Alternatively, Logevall condemns Johnson for not withdrawing American troops after the election and focuses on his character as the instigator for escalation.

Thirdly, Barrett criticises him for not listening to his advisers and suggests opposition against escalation was greater than previously asserted. Johnson was certainly not an advocate of escalation. Although Johnson did act swiftly to gain Congress approval, he did not exploit the attacks for military escalation. Instead, the resolution embodies an excellent example of Realpolitik. Johnson was eager to neutralize Vietnam as an issue in the presidential campaign and illustrate to voters that he was as tough as the Republican candidate Goldwater.

Also, Logevall is wrong to claim the domino theory was losing its influence in U. Firstly, the Tonkin resolution was passed by a vast majority in the House and Senate. Reporters such as Halberstam, who became gravely alienated by the war, initially supported retaliation.

Furthermore, even if Barrett is correct in exemplifying the number of opponents against escalation he fails to illustrate the lack of alternatives. Although consultants, notably Ball and Mansfield, opposed escalation they were unable to spell out how a negotiated withdrawal could be secured. Besides, Johnson was not a victim of groupthink. Instead, Johnson escalated because he did not have a better alternative.

By February the situation had morphed into perilous anarchy. Additionally, the Vietcong utilised the quandaries by overrunning the strategic hamlet fortifications in the countryside. More crucially, guerrilla forces began attacking U.

For instance on Christmas Eve the Vietcong bombed a bar often frequented by U. Indeed, twice in the last months of U. However, in this context escalation began to loom as the only solution. His successful intervention in the Dominican Republic suggested U. Fear for his Great Society as well as concern for U. By early over two hundred U. With the benefit of hindsight it becomes clear that all three historical interpretations of the Vietnam War are incorrect.

Indeed, out of all the presidents, Kennedy is the most accountable for moving Washington towards escalation. The Buddhist crisis as well as both American and South Vietnamese antipathy gave Kennedy the perfect opportunity to cut U. Instead, he handed Johnson a political quagmire which psychologically obligated him to stick by Saigon. Incidentally, historians such as Freedman place too much emphasis on what would have happened had Kennedy survived the Dallas shooting. Lastly, it is erroneous to portray Johnson as a blood thirsty hawk who advocated war.

Instead, he chose escalation because there was no apparent alternative. Thus, although each president is accountable for moving the U. His advisers and the decision to escalate the Vietnam War. Political Science Quarterly. The Review of Politics. The Journal of American History. Fifty years ago, during the first six months of , Lyndon Johnson made the decision to Americanize the conflict in Vietnam.

His vice-president, Hubert Humphrey advised him against it. So did his long time mentor and friend, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia. Inside the administration, Undersecretary of State George Ball also made the case for restraint. The war, they said, would have to be limited in scope. Communist China made it clear that it would not permit an invasion of North Vietnam.

For fear of provoking an all-out war with the communist superpowers, the Johnson administration would forswear not only an invasion but also any attempts to sponsor an anti-communist insurgency in the North. The state of South Vietnam was in many ways artificial. The flag of Vietnamese nationalism had been captured by the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh and his followers in the north: it would not be easily wrested from them. Indeed, George Ball predicted that the United States would eventually have to put half a million troops in Vietnam, a prediction which Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara vehemently rejected.

During the intense debated that occurred within the foreign policy establishment in the spring and summer of , Johnson himself was frequently the leading dove. Shortly after, he vented to adviser McGeorge Bundy in a now familiar monologue:.

And in July he agreed to the dispatch of two combat divisions to Vietnam. American intelligence and Foreign Service operatives on the ground began requesting new assignments.